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FAST MONEY? THE CONTRIBUTION OF STATE TAX 
AMNESTIES TO PUBLIC REVENUE SYSTEMS
John L. Mikesell and Justin M. Ross
State tax amnesties have become a commonplace component of state tax administra-
tion over the last 30 years. This paper reviews the structural evolution of all state 
amnesty programs and makes the case that their fundamental purpose has shifted 
from improving tax administration to emphasizing revenue maximization. It then 
provides empirical evidence on which state amnesty program features aid in this 
effort. The regression results reveal that most of the malleable amnesty program 
features that tend to increase amnesty recoveries also confl ict with or undermine 
the goal of improving the tax administration system.
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More that 20 years ago, Alm, McKee, and Beck (1990, p. 23) wrote, 
Beleaguered by declining tax revenues and mounting expenditures, many 
state governments in recent years have sought alternative and novel revenue 
sources. One approach that has been used by twenty-eight states since 1981 
is the tax amnesty. 
At the time, those states had conducted a total of 37 amnesties, and the programs still 
carried a sense of being a new development for American government fi nance. Amnes-
ties seemed to be a tool more appropriate for chronically non-compliant European or 
developing countries, which could use them to boost collections and possibly compli-
ance. American observers were principally worried about the consequences of tax 
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amnesties for voluntary compliance, especially if taxpayers developed an expectation 
that the next amnesty might be just on the horizon.1
The reviews of these early efforts concluded that tax amnesties were fi rst and fore-
most a tool for improving tax administration. In a study of the fi rst 26 state amnesty 
programs, Mikesell (1986) examined their structural features, noting throughout how 
these attributes contributed to the state system of tax administration. In a pair of inde-
pendent surveys of state tax administrators, Ross (1986) and Parle and Hirlinger (1986) 
reviewed the goals and objectives of the early amnesty programs.2 They similarly found 
relatively little interest among the states in boosting short-term revenue, as emphasis 
was placed on bundling the amnesty with other enforcement strategies and improved 
compliance initiatives. 
After 117 programs (and counting) over 30 years,3 we argue in this paper that amnesties 
have evolved into a standard component of American state tax collection systems with 
a purpose quite different from the administrative functions described in the contribu-
tions of Mikesell, Parle and Hirlinger, and Ross cited above. Specifi cally, we argue 
that amnesties have become tools of revenue generation, and that this is being pursued 
even at the expense of existing systems of tax administration. To demonstrate this, the 
fi rst part of this article provides a narrative analysis of the path of state tax amnesty 
programs since 1981, paying particular attention to the amnesty features highlighted in 
Mikesell (1986). This overview demonstrates the differences in structure between the 
early surge of amnesties in the 1980s and more recent amnesties (the 66 conducted or 
scheduled since 2000). This paper then regresses amnesty recoveries against features 
of the amnesty programs. The empirical evidence indicates that most program features 
that are correlated with greater recoveries are those which confl ict with tax administra-
tion concerns.
 1 The fi rst tax amnesty on record was reported on the Rosetta stone, an amnesty declared by Ptolemy V 
Epiphanes in Egypt, circa 200 BC. The stone itself expressed the appreciation of the priesthood for the 
program. It is not clear whether any state amnesties were based on this experience.
 2 Ross (1986) was able to survey more states, but was a bit less expansive on the issues relevant to state 
administration than Parle and Hirlinger (1986).
 3 This count is through December 2011. The tally does not include special use tax amnesties variously granted 
to try to induce remote vendors or their in-state clients to come forward with otherwise uncollected tax, for 
instance, the Illinois amnesty for remote vendor purchases for January 1–October 15, 2011 or other special 
amnesties to bring fi rms into programs associated with the Streamlined Sales Tax Program. Likewise, it 
does not include narrow programs like the Kentucky “Expedited Protest Resolution” program of 2010 
(the Kentucky Department of Revenue (2010) explicitly states that this program was not an amnesty), or 
the Minnesota 2010 amnesty for offshore accounts and foreign entities used to evade taxes. It does not 
include the Pennsylvania use tax self-audit/amnesty program from March 1, 1983–June 30, 1983 that 
waived penalty and interest for previously unknown liabilities from 1980–1982 and recovered $2,452,499. 
A similar use tax program conducted by Maine from July 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 for liabilities 
from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2005 is also not included. The count also excludes permanent 
“voluntary compliance initiatives” offered in many states that offer open-ended forgiveness of penalties 
for taxpayers who voluntarily come forward with liability previously unknown to the state. Also, it does 
not count local tax amnesties conducted separately from those run by the state.
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The layout of the paper is as follows. The next section provides background on tax 
amnesties drawing on the previous literature especially as it pertains to systems of 
tax administration. Section II discusses the pattern of amnesty offerings and revenue 
recoveries across the states over time. Section III proceeds with a narrative analysis of 
how the program features within the amnesties have evolved over time to refl ect a tool 
for revenue generation rather than improving administration. Section IV presents an 
empirical analysis of how these features actually affect revenue recovery, and Section 
V concludes.
I. THE AMNESTY IDEA
Baer and LeBorgne (2008, p. 5) defi ne a tax amnesty to be “a limited-time offer by 
the government to a specifi ed group of taxpayers to pay a defi ned amount, in exchange 
for forgiveness of a tax liability (including interest and penalties), relating to a previous 
tax period(s), as well as freedom from legal prosecution.”4 These temporary programs 
allow taxpayers who have previously evaded taxation to voluntarily remit unpaid taxes 
without incurring all the sanctions that failure of timely payment would ordinarily 
incur. If collected through enforcement action, taxpayers with these liabilities would 
owe the tax plus various penalties and interest on the unpaid amount and might also 
be subject to felony prosecution. By participating in the amnesty, taxpayers can avoid 
certain program-specifi ed consequences. 
To consider the contribution and the complication that an amnesty might make to tax 
administration fi rst requires an understanding of tax administration itself. Penniman 
(1980, p.173) aptly characterized tax administration in this way: “… the tax offi cial’s 
service can be generalized only in terms of the value of the revenue he collects for the 
operation of all government and in the fairness with which he collects such revenue 
within the state’s tax framework.” The tax amnesty likewise must balance revenue and 
fairness in the service of tax administration. One contribution is the extra revenue that 
may fl ow from the amnesty, which the amnesty no doubt accomplishes in a manner 
particularly appealing to elected representatives. Amnesty collections emerge without 
the politically diffi cult tasks of increasing statutory rates or changing defi nitions in 
the tax base. Amnesty programs, however, raise equity concerns that likely impact the 
overall effi ciency of state tax administration. Because the money comes from those 
who previously had shirked payment, the amnesty understandably strikes the public as 
a special deal for evaders and therefore arguably violates principles of general fairness. 
Honest taxpayers may believe they have been cheated by the special deal provided to 
evaders, which could harm overall compliance by encouraging the attitude that waiting 
for the next amnesty is better than perpetual voluntary compliance. Since most major 
tax systems rely on voluntary compliance to generate collections, putting the honest 
taxpayer at regular economic disadvantage conceivably works against the efforts of 
 4 Forgiveness in the American states involves penalties, interest, and prosecution, not the basic liability.
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an effi cient system of tax administration. Furthermore, the only new revenue truly 
generated by the amnesty comes from those collections that would not otherwise be 
uncovered through normal enforcement efforts. Amnesty programs are revenue losers 
on accounts whose collection would occur without forgiveness, but surrender interest 
and penalties nevertheless. Hence there is a concern that the amnesty may harm the 
compliance climate and discriminate against the honest taxpayer for what may be little 
true new revenue. The diffi culty in accomplishing this balancing act between obtaining 
additional revenues and harming the compliance climate is the source of the reluctance 
that states historically had in regard to the amnesties.
The compliance effect of the amnesty seems crucial both in terms of revenue potential 
and as a signal of equity implications, but empirical evidence of such an impact is far 
from conclusive due to the complexity of the research question. A few studies have 
studied individual amnesty programs and the responses by taxpayers over time. From a 
random sample of tax amnesty participants, Fisher, Goodeeris, and Young (1989) found 
that the early Michigan experience did not signifi cantly bring previously unknown 
delinquent taxpayers permanently back to the tax rolls. Instead, they found that most 
amnesty participants were taxpayers known to the state who were paying only a portion 
of unpaid liabilities, and that a high estimate of the new taxpayers remaining on the 
rolls permanently was about 21 percent; Christian, Gupta, and Young (2002) came to 
similar conclusions on the same Michigan-1 (1986) amnesty after examining subsequent 
fi lings over a longer time horizon. Likewise, Joulfaian (1989) found that more than half 
of the Massachusetts-1 (1983) program participants were known delinquents, and 70 
percent of their liabilities were less than four years old, which are the most likely to be 
collected under routine operations. Alm and Beck (1993) found no effect, positive or 
negative, in a careful time-series analysis of tax collection levels and trends that could 
be attributed to the 1985 Colorado amnesty program. Though informative, the main 
drawback of these single program ex-post analyses is that there is no variation at the 
program level; there are also concerns regarding their external validity. 
Luitel and Sobel (2007) extended the literature by examining multiple states over 
time by drawing upon 37 state quarterly revenue collections with “regular” tax systems 
between 1981 and 2004.5 In a series of panel fi xed effect regressions, they found robust 
evidence that repeated offerings of amnesty reduced state revenue collections, which 
is consistent with a compliance problem in post-amnesty periods. A limitation of the 
Luitel and Sobel (2007) analysis, however, was the diffi culty in determining whether a 
downward trend in revenue collections following each amnesty iteration was a conse-
quence of the amnesty itself, or if instead states repeatedly offer and reoffer amnesties 
because of persistent revenue problems. 
Alm, McKee, and Beck (1990) found that participant taxpayer compliance decreased 
with amnesty offerings in an experimental setting, better allowing for the randomization 
not found in real world policy. In their experiment, subjects were divided into different 
sessions where they would voluntarily report their income for taxation over 25 rounds. 
 5 They defi ned “regular” tax systems as those that did not exclude a major tax base like sales or income. 
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By itself, the introduction of an amnesty did appear to lower compliance, but introduc-
ing new enforcement strategies and making promises of the amnesty being a “one-time 
event” appeared to be successful in offsetting this effect. This might be considered the 
strongest evidence that improving long-run compliance post-amnesty is possible, but it 
is not clear that the experimental settings transfer to the real world of politics and policy. 
For instance, lab administrators might be considered more credible by their subjects in 
such promises than state policy makers would be by their constituencies.
Though all the studies have their limitations, the preponderance of evidence is against 
the view that amnesties increase long-run revenues. The clearest conclusion from this 
research is that the fi scal contribution of an amnesty is in the direct recovery during the 
amnesty but not later.6 Therefore, it is important to measure and understand this direct 
recovery revenue because it may well be the only fi scal contribution of the amnesty.
II. AMNESTIES AND THEIR RECOVERIES
Since 1980, 45 states plus the District of Columbia have conducted at least one formal 
tax amnesty program; all but 11 of these have run more than one program, certainly 
casting doubt on the claims sometimes made by the states that the program offers a 
“one-time opportunity” for an honest, new start with the tax authorities.7 Figure 1 shows 
the annual frequency of state programs during the American amnesty era from 1981.8 
The 1980s were a period of aggressive experimentation with 33 amnesty programs in 
30 states, with Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana having repeated programs. Amnesties of 
this time did not stem from fi scal stress, but as Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1992) note, 
they were likely a state reaction to reduced federal enforcement efforts in that period 
that resulted in a lower compliance environment.9 State tax offi cials described the 
amnesties in terms of improving and updating their administrative systems (Parle and 
Hirlinger, 1986), and this was likewise refl ected in the amnesty features and accompa-
nying programs (Mikesell, 1986).
 6 Baer and LeBorgne (2008) review research on both American and international amnesties. They also con-
clude that there is no evidence of a positive impact on revenue fl ows after the amnesty and some evidence 
of a negative impact.
 7 The fi ve states abstaining from amnesties are Alaska, Montana, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. It is note-
worthy that four of these fi ve states omit a major broad based tax, but this observation is not particularly 
conclusive since other states without such taxes have offered amnesties multiple times. Likewise, Alaska, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming rely more on revenues from extractive resources, but Texas has a similar tax 
base and has offered three amnesties..
 8 Note that 14 of the amnesties started in one year and ended in the next. This and later fi gures will follow 
the convention of counting the amnesty and its recovery in the start year. There is no reliable way of pars-
ing the recoveries between years or of identifying any installment payments, in the few instances in which 
they have been permitted, to a later year. These magnitudes are modest, in any case.
 9 In a later unpublished study, LeBorgne (2006) fi nds amnesties are more likely when a state is experiencing 
a budget defi cit. However, LeBorgne’s analysis stops in 1996 before the diffi cult recessionary environment 
of the 2000s and the concurrent fl urry of amnesties. Luitel and Tosun (2010) extend the analysis up to 
2005 and likewise fi nd fi scal stress to be an important determinant of amnesty (re)enactment.
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The amnesty pace declined in the 1990s, when there were only 18 occurrences, eight 
of which came from states offering programs for the fi rst time. The 2000s brought a 
fl urry of 51 amnesties, however, and 15 more have been conducted in 2010, 2011, or 
are already scheduled for 2012. The fi gure shows dramatic increases in amnesties at 
both ends of the period from 2000 to the present. This pattern is almost certainly related 
to the declines in state tax collections during and shortly after the recessions of 2001 
and 2007–2009, combined with general public opposition to statutory tax increases as 
a source of additional revenue.
Table 1 identifi es the state (and District of Columbia) tax amnesties conducted since 
1981. Along with the dates of each amnesty, the table identifi es the gross state tax 
recovery in current and constant dollars from each program.10 Collections reported in the 
table are gross values for several reasons. First, tax revenue generated by other methods 
is traditionally reported on a gross, not net, basis. There are no deductions for the cost 
of collecting the revenue — those administrative costs are captured on the expenditure 










































































Frequency of Tax Amnesties, 1981–2012
10 Table 1 is produced from state amnesty evaluation reports, state press releases, news reports, state statutes, 
and various third party tabulations. One important third party source is the Federation of Tax Adminis-
trators tabulation available at their website, Federation of Tax Administrators, Washington, DC, http://
www.taxadmin.org/. While this list provides a good initial source, it does omit some state programs. Two 
important additional sources, both requiring additions and corrections, are Mikesell (1986) and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (1998). 
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Table 1
Revenue Recovery by State Amnesty Program Since 1980
State   Begin Date   End Date
  Recovery 
    ($)
 Real Recovery 
   (2005$)
Alabama-1 1/20/1984 4/1/1984 3,140,000 5,249,344
Alabama-2 2/1/2009 5/15/2009 8,100,000 7,381,822
Arizona-1 11/22/1982 1/20/1983 6,000,000 10,407,271
Arizona-2 1/1/2002 2/28/2002 10,000,000 10,846,458
Arizona-3 9/1/2003 10/31/2003 51,000,000 54,177,511
Arizona-4 5/1/2009 6/1/2009 32,000,000 29,162,756
Arizona-5 9/1/2011 10/1/2011 Not available  
Arkansas-1 9/1/1987 11/30/1987 1,700,000 2,622,688
Arkansas-2 9/1/1997 11/30/1997 3,000,000 3,544,926
Arkansas-3 7/1/2004 9/30/2004 3,556,683 3,674,791
California-1 12/10/1984 3/15/1985 197,000,000 329,337,814
California-2 2/1/2005 3/31/2005 675,000,000 675,000,000
Colorado-1 9/16/1985 11/15/1985 6,323,744 10,261,154
Colorado-2 6/1/2003 6/30/2003 18,000,000 19,121,474
Colorado-3 10/1/2011 11/15/2011 > $11.000,000  
Connecticut-1 9/1/1990 11/30/1990 54,000,000 74,728,073
Connecticut-2 9/1/1995 11/30/1995 46,200,000 56,613,484
Connecticut-3 9/1/2002 12/2/2002 109,000,000 118,226,387
Connecticut-4 5/1/2009 6/25/2009 40,000,000 36,453,444
Delaware-1 9/1/2009 10/30/2009 22,000,000 20,049,394
District of Columbia-1 7/1/1987 9/30/1987 24,300,000 37,489,008
District of Columbia-2 7/10/1995 8/31/1995 19,500,000 23,895,302
District of Columbia-3 8/2/2010 9/30/2010 20,800,000 18,740,089
Florida-1 1/1/1987 6/30/1987 13,000,000 20,055,848
Florida-2 1/1/1988 6/30/1988 8,400,000 12,528,712
Florida-3 10/1/1992 12/3/1992 14,000,000 18,277,240
Florida-4 7/1/2003 10/31/2003 268,000,000 284,697,509
Florida-5 7/1/2010 9/30/2010 82,900,000 74,690,068
Georgia-1 10/1/1992 12/5/1992 51,300,000 66,973,028
Hawaii-1 5/27/2009 6/26/2009 14,000,000 12,758,706
Idaho-1 5/20/1983 8/30/1983 300,000 520,364
Illinois-1 12/28/1981 1/8/1982 89,000 170,270
Illinois-2 10/1/1984 11/30/1984 160,500,000 268,318,371
Illinois-3 10/1/2003 11/17/2003 532,000,000 565,145,801
Illinois-4 10/1/2010 11/8/2010 546,700,000 492,558,022
Indiana-1 9/15/2005 11/15/2005 244,678,090 244,678,090
Iowa-1 9/2/1986 10/31/1986 34,500,000 54,769,729
Iowa-2 9/4/2007 10/31/2007 28,291,220 26,632,796
Kansas-1 7/1/1984 9/30/1984 593,787 992,673
Kansas-2 10/1/2003 11/30/2003 24,000,000 25,495,299
Kansas-3 9/1/2010 10/15/2010 10,222,500 9,210,123
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Kentucky-1 9/15/1988 9/30/1988 61,100,000 91,131,462
Kentucky-2 8/1/2002 9/30/2002 100,000,000 108,464,575
Louisiana-1 10/1/1985 12/31/1985 1,209,538 1,962,643
Louisiana-2 10/1/1987 12/15/1987 279,000 430,429
Louisiana-3 10/1/1998 12/31/1998 1,300,000 1,518,976
Louisiana-4 9/1/2001 10/30/2001 173,100,000 190,792,157
Louisiana-5 9/1/2009 10/31/2009 303,700,000 276,772,777
Maine-1 11/1/1990 12/31/1990 29,000,000 40,131,743
Maine-2 9/1/2003 11/30/2003 37,600,000 39,942,636
Maine-3 9/1/2009 11/30/2009 16,200,000 14,763,645
Maine-4 9/1/2010 11/30/2010 8,100,000 7,297,823
Maryland-1 9/1/1987 11/2/1987 34,600,000 53,379,410
Maryland-2 9/1/2001 10/31/2001 39,200,000 43,206,543
Maryland-3 9/1/2009 10/31/2009 26,000,000 23,694,739
Massachusetts-1 10/17/1983 1/17/1984 84,600,000 146,742,524
Massachusetts-2 10/1/2002 11/30/2002 96,100,000 104,234,457
Massachusetts-3 1/1/2003 2/28/2003 46,900,000 49,822,064
Massachusetts-4 4/1/2010 6/1/2010 32,570,027 29,344,482
Michigan-1 5/12/1986 6/30/1986 109,800,000 174,310,616
Michigan-2 5/15/2002 6/30/2002 81,990,000 88,930,105
Michigan-3 5/15/2011 6/30/2011 76,000,000 66,978,056
Minnesota-1 8/1/1984 10/31/1984 12,100,000 20,228,363
Mississippi-1 9/1/1986 11/30/1986 1,000,000 1,587,528
Mississippi-2 9/1/2004 12/31/2004 7,900,000 8,162,338
Missouri-1 9/1/1983 10/31/1983 853,217 1,479,943
Missouri-2 8/1/2002 10/31/2002 76,400,000 82,866,936
Missouri-3 8/1/2003 10/31/2003 24,000,000 25,495,299
Nebraska-1 8/1/2004 10/31/2004 7,500,000 7,749,055
Nevada-1 2/1/2002 6/30/2002 7,300,000 7,917,914
Nevada-2 7/1/2008 11/28/2008 27,000,000 24,866,000
Nevada-3 7/1/2010 10/1/2010 28,500,000 25,677,526
New Hampshire-1 12/1/1997 2/17/1998 13,500,000 15,773,976
New Hampshire-2 12/1/2001 2/15/2002 13,500,000 14,879,804
New Jersey-1 9/10/1987 12/8/1987 186,500,000 287,724,278
New Jersey-2 3/15/1996 6/1/1996 359,000,000 431,703,123
New Jersey-3 4/15/2002 6/10/2002 276,900,000 300,338,409
New Jersey-4 5/4/2009 6/15/2009 725,000,000 660,718,680
New Mexico-1 8/15/1985 11/13/1985 13,688,626 22,211,699
New Mexico-2 8/16/1999 11/12/1999 45,000,000 51,818,245
New Mexico-3 6/7/2010 9/30/2010 9,900,000 8,919,562
Table 1 (continued)
Revenue Recovery by State Amnesty Program Since 1980
State   Begin Date   End Date
  Recovery 
    ($)
 Real Recovery 
   (2005$)
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New York-1 11/1/1985 1/31/1986 401,300,000 651,165,055
New York-2 11/1/1996 1/31/1997 253,400,000 299,428,085
New York-3 11/18/2002 1/31/2003 582,700,000 632,023,081
New York-4 10/1/2005 3/1/2006 349,000,000 349,000,000
New York-5 1/15/2010 3/15/2010 50,000,000 45,048,292
North Carolina-1 9/1/1989 12/1/1989 37,600,000 54,040,847
North Dakota-1 9/1/1983 11/30/1983 150,000 260,182
North Dakota-2 10/1/2003 1/31/2004 6,900,000 7,329,899
Ohio-1 10/15/2001 1/15/2002 22,000,000 24,248,570
Ohio-2 1/1/2006 2/15/2006 63,000,000 61,028,180
Ohio-3 1/1/2012 2/15/2012 SCHEDULED  
Oklahoma-1 7/1/1984 12/31/1984 13,902,248 23,241,299
Oklahoma-2 8/15/2002 11/15/2002 38,800,000 42,084,255
Oklahoma-3 9/15/2008 11/14/2008 81,900,000 75,426,866
Oregon-1 10/1/2009 11/19/2009 33,000,000 30,074,092
Pennsylvania-1 10/13/1995 1/10/1996 93,000,000 111,833,957
Pennsylvania-2 4/26/2010 6/18/2010 261,000,000 235,152,083
Rhode Island-1 10/15/1986 1/12/1987 700,000 1,079,930
Rhode Island-2 4/15/1996 6/28/1996 7,900,000 9,499,874
Rhode Island-3 7/15/2006 9/30/2006 6,500,000 6,296,558
South Carolina-1 9/1/1985 11/30/1985 7,500,000 12,169,793
South Carolina-2 10/15/2002 12/2/2002 7,100,000 7,700,985
South Dakota-1 4/1/1999 5/15/1999 500,000 575,758
Texas-1 2/1/1984 2/29/1984 396,351 662,606
Texas-2 3/11/2004 3/31/2004 379,000,000 391,585,560
Texas-3 6/15/2007 8/15/2007 93,000,000 87,548,363
Vermont-1 5/15/1990 6/25/1990 1,000,000 1,383,853
Vermont-2 7/20/2009 8/31/2009 1,100,000 1,002,470
Virginia-1 2/1/1990 3/31/1990 32,200,000 44,560,073
Virginia-2 9/2/2003 11/3/2003 98,000,000 104,105,805
Virginia-3 10/7/2009 12/5/2009 102,100,000 93,047,417
Washington-1 2/1/2011 4/18/2011 263,000,000 233,989,929
West Virginia-1 10/1/1986 12/31/1986 15,900,000 25,241,701
West Virginia-2 9/1/2004 10/31/2004 11,169,609 11,540,521
Wisconsin-1 9/15/1985 11/22/1985 26,800,000 43,486,727
Wisconsin-2 6/15/1998 8/14/1998 30,900,000 36,104,879
Total 9,951,403,640 11,032,393,923 
Mean 87,293,014 96,775,385 
Median 28,395,610 29,253,619 
Table 1 (continued)
Revenue Recovery by State Amnesty Program Since 1980
State   Begin Date   End Date
  Recovery 
    ($)
 Real Recovery 
   (2005$)
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tax revenue.11 Second, where data on the cost of running an amnesty are available, such 
cost is modest in comparison with collections, so reporting revenues on a net basis 
would have little impact on the amounts. In many instances, the amnesty program is 
administered with resources redirected from an existing department, and as a result the 
reported program cost is zero because there was no special budget appropriation. Third, 
there has been no standard approach to calculating program cost, meaning that there 
would be considerable inconsistency in reporting for net numbers. States which report 
“net revenues” may or may not have counted an estimate of forgone penalties and inter-
est as program costs, for instance. For these reasons, gross collections are appropriate 
for comparing and evaluating the results of state amnesty programs. The vagaries of 
the data reporting process dictate considerable caution in use of the results. These are 
important data, however, because they remain the common basis on which states evaluate 
and promote the success of the amnesty. Because the existing evidence suggests there 
is no positive impact on revenue fl ow after the amnesty (Baer and LeBorgne, 2008), 
and that the impact may even be negative, the emphasis on the fi scal contribution of 
the direct amnesty recoveries is the appropriate focus of attention.12
In the aggregate, state amnesties report over $10.7 billion in recoveries (when adjusted 
to 2005 prices), a substantial but modest number in comparison to the $1.3 trillion total 
tax revenues collected during the equivalent periods. Revenue production has, how-
ever, varied widely across state programs. In real terms, the greatest collections were 
from the California-2 (2005) program ($683.4 million) and the New Jersey-4 (2009) 
program ($661.7 million), and the smallest were from the Illinois-1 (1981) program 
($165.9 thousand) and the North Dakota-1 (1983) program in ($259.2 thousand). The 
largest amnesty numbers are big enough to draw public attention to the results, even 
though the proceeds look much smaller when compared to the total tax revenues of the 
state. For instance, total tax collections in New Jersey in 2009 exceeded $24 billion 
— the amnesty proceeds were 2.7 percent of that amount, which is hardly enough to 
dramatically change the state’s fundamental fi scal situation and not a fl ow that would 
be a permanent component of annual revenue.
States do not report the type of tax for which the amnesty has made a recovery as 
regularly as they report total recoveries. Table 2 shows the distribution across taxes for 
11 One exception to this use of gross rather than net collections is in regard to reporting for state lottery rev-
enue in Bureau of Census Governments Division state revenue reports. This revenue is included in state 
revenue data on a net basis in miscellaneous revenues.
12 Even gross recovery can be a misleading indication of fi scal contribution. In one of the few careful analyses 
of the quality of amnesty revenue, the New York State Offi ce of Tax Policy Analysis (2004) estimated that, 
of the reported $582 million from the 2002 amnesty, net new revenue was only $83 million. The difference 
constituted waived penalty and interest ($294 million), revenue foregone from other compliance operations 
($74.2 million), and revenue in the program that would have been collected without the amnesty ($131 
million). Few other states have so thoroughly examined the quality of the amnesty recoveries. The Kansas 
Department of Revenue in its Amnesty 2010 Final Report did report a waiver of penalty and interest of 
$7.2 million on an amnesty recovery of $10.77 million (state plus local), but gave no estimate of what 
might have been recovered in absence of the amnesty.
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Table 2
Amnesty Recoveries and Total State Tax Revenue by Type of Tax
 
Percent of Total 
Amnesty Recoveries















Arkansas-3 (2004)  8.00 81.00 10.00 39.36 28.68  4.24
Colorado-1 (1985) 19.01 67.82  6.60 31.42 40.78  4.99
Connecticut-3 (2002) 54.95 19.02 15.75 32.24 38.27  3.62
Illinois-2 (1984) 19.95  5.97 72.97 34.47 28.19  7.65
Illinois-4 (2010) 24.30  6.45 46.04 22.96 38.07 11.31
Indiana-1 (2005) 27.36 15.13 35.84 39.15 32.16  7.66
Iowa-2 (2007) 31.66 23.26 40.98 26.71 41.33  5.04
Kansas-1 (1984) 23.02 68.37  7.98 28.56 31.51  8.34
Kansas-3 (2010) 15.72 42.15 37.88 33.10 41.10  5.40
Kentucky-2 (2002) 31.12 12.06 15.11 28.70 33.83  4.44
Louisiana-1 (1985) 70.09 11.28  4.47 31.27 12.61  7.27
Massachusetts-1 (1983) 26.00 48.58  9.34 21.37 47.78 12.49
Michigan-2 (2002) 28.71 22.51 34.58 35.60 28.02  9.45
Missouri-1 (1983)  6.56  4.53 87.91 43.51 29.60  5.43
New Jersey-3 (2002) 32.00 22.00 38.00 32.72 37.30  6.01
New Mexico-1 (1985) 57.23  8.76  4.24 42.81  7.02  4.93
New York-1 (1985) 39.13 44.13 14.59 20.93 50.92  8.36
New York-3 (2002) 28.64 53.35  2.16 20.93 53.60  4.94
North Dakota-2 (2003) 31.12  8.28 56.65 29.89 17.41  4.05
Ohio-1 (2002) 38.80 19.70 15.55 31.75 41.41  3.78
Oklahoma-2 (2002) 21.13 51.29 17.27 25.06 35.79  1.77
Pennsylvania-1 (1995) 22.47 15.01 37.45 31.16 28.50  8.22
Pennsylvania-2 (2010) 33.91 20.74 36.82 27.52 30.65  5.40
West Virginia-2 (2004) 53.86 19.04 14.52 25.47 27.25 10.77
       
Mean 31.03 28.77 27.61 30.69 33.41  6.48
Median 28.68 20.22 16.51 31.22 32.99  5.41
Notes: Amnesty recoveries come from state reports. Tax revenue data are from U.S. Bureau of Census, 
Governments Division (http://www.census.gov/govs/). 
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the 23 states for which these data are available.13 The table also presents the distribu-
tion of total tax revenue across taxes so that a comparison with amnesty results can be 
made. The table focuses on sales and use, individual income, and corporate income 
taxes because these are the most signifi cant taxes in these states; furthermore, the total 
recoveries from the three exceed 80 percent of the total in all but four of the states. It 
is apparent the amnesties vary dramatically in regard to the relative yields for the three 
taxes. While the averages across all states are similar — around 30 percent for each — 
the variation from state to state is dramatic: sales and use tax shares range from 6.56 
percent (Missouri-1 (1983)) to 70.09 percent (Louisiana-1 (1985)); individual income 
tax shares range from 4.53 percent (Missouri-1 (1983)) to 81 percent (Arkansas-1 
(1987)); corporate income tax shares range from 2.16 percent (New York-3 (2002)) to 
87.91 percent (Missouri-1 (1983)).14 For some states, recoveries are heavily drawn from 
the sales and use tax, and for others the income tax is the primary source.15 Seldom is 
there a close balance between recovery shares of sales and use and individual income 
taxes for an individual state. The table shows both a close balance in virtually all states 
between the revenues from sales and use and individual income taxes and only a mod-
est contribution from the corporate income tax to total tax revenue. Amnesty recovery 
patterns diverge substantially from that, possibly revealing some differences in the 
level of evasion across taxes, but it is just as likely that this divergence simply reveals 
a difference in amnesty participation for unknown reasons.
Although these amnesty recoveries were no doubt welcome, in comparison with 
the size of fi scal defi cits being experienced by many American states in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession, they were modest. To the extent that state fi scal problems are 
structural and not cyclical, the onetime revenue from the amnesty will not provide the 
needed solution and will harm a state’s long term fi scal prospects to the extent it creates 
the feared compliance incentive problem.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AMNESTY STRUCTURE: FROM ADMINISTRATIVE TO 
  REVENUE CONCERN
There are several important program design differences across the state amnesties, and 
these features can be critical to determining how much revenue the amnesty immediately 
recovers relative to its impact on the state tax compliance climate. Table 3 shows how 
several of these signifi cant features of the programs have evolved across the decades.
13 State after action report sources include: Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (2008); 
Indiana Department of Revenue (2006); Iowa Department of Revenue (2008); Kentucky Revenue Cabi-
net (2003); Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Revenue (2010); Michigan Department of 
Treasury (2003); New Hampshire Department of Revenue (2002); New York State Offi ce of Tax Policy 
Analysis (2004); Kaufmann (2004); Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (1995); Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Revenue (2010); West Virginia State Tax Department (2005).
14 The table includes only states with all three taxes. Amnesties in Texas, with no income tax, are obviously 
almost entirely sales and use tax recovery, and the Washington state amnesty, another state with no income 
tax, would refl ect sales and use and business and occupation taxes. 
15 For the few states that provide the information, most amnesty returns come from individual income tax fi lers.
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Table 3












Number of amnesties 33 18 51 15 117
      
Average length of amnesty 
(days)      
 Mean 84.15 72.4 71.3 63.13 74.06
 Median 90 76 60 59 64
     
Calendar quarter of amnesty 
(% of all)      
 First 12.1 11.1 13.7 20.0 13.6
 Second 6.1 16.7 15.7 20.0 13.6
 Third 51.5 27.8 49.0 40.0 45.3
 Fourth 30.3 44.4 21.6 20.0 27.4
      
Period since last amnesty 
(% of all)      
 First time 90.9 44.4 13.7 6.7 37.6
 Five years or more 83.3 88.9 84.3 73.3 85.5
 10 years or more 83.3 72.2 58.8 26.7 35.0
      
Eligibility of accounts 
receivables (number)     
 Yes 15 15 36 12 78
 No 18 3 15 3 39
      
Installment payments 
(number)      
 Yes 16 8 15 1 40
 No 17 9 36 14 76
 Unknown  1   1
      
Waived      
 Prosecution only 1 1 0 0 2
 Reduced penalty 1 0 1 0 2
 Penalty 18 3 8 3 32
 Penalty and part of interest 4 1 23 4 32
 Penalty and interest 2 1 16 5 24
 Other 1 1 1 3 6
 Unknown 6 11 2 0 19
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A. Eligible Liabilities and Applicants
The tax previously unpaid to states may include several logical categories: accounts 
receivable, taxes from delinquent fi lers who may be either accounts known to the tax 
department or previously unknown, taxes from incomplete prior returns, and taxes from 
fi rms or fi lers previously unknown to the state.16 While some early amnesties provided 
extremely limited eligibility (Texas-1 (1984) limited eligibility to unregistered merchants 
and Idaho-1 (1983) limited eligibility to periods in which no return had been fi led), 
such narrow eligibility has been the exception.17
The major distinction across the earlier amnesties was the inclusion of accounts 
receivable in the program. While the amnesties of the 1980s were closely divided in the 
eligibility of these liabilities (15 included them, while 18 did not), amnesties since then 
have overwhelmingly included accounts receivable (63 have, while only 21 have not). 
In 1986, Mikesell pointed out that inclusion of accounts receivable in amnesty eligibility 
was at that time a strong distinguishing feature between programs with high per capita 
recoveries and those with low per capita recoveries, and Alm and Beck (1991) would 
later fi nd the inclusion of accounts receivable to be a statistically signifi cant determinant 
of total amnesty recoveries. Since then, states have overwhelmingly included liabili-
ties in accounts receivable, even though these represent the softest results in terms of 
producing new net revenue and in terms of rewarding non-compliance. Because the 
liability is both known and established, these revenues are most likely going to be col-
lected through the enforcement mechanisms available to the state if the taxpayer has any 
recoverable fi nancial resources. Taxpayers truly without the means to get current from 
accounts receivable would be unlikely to have the means to become current through an 
amnesty program. It is diffi cult to view the inclusion of accounts receivable as having 
a purpose beyond speeding up the collection process by a few months.
B. Forgiveness of Penalties and Interest
Features that characterize all state amnesty programs include the following: they do 
not forgive the basic tax owed, they do not close tax years for potential audit, and they 
all waive criminal prosecution for violations included in the amnesty. Beyond those 
elements, the state programs mix varying degrees of forgiveness of fi nancial penalties 
and interest that would have otherwise been owed by the non-compliant taxpayer. Table 
3 shows that amnesties have extended more toward forgiveness of interest across the 
decades. In the 1980s, amnesties generally provided for cancelled penalties, but con-
tinued at least part of the interest liability. For the 2000s, virtually all amnesties granted 
16 Accounts receivable includes “tax evaders who have already been detected by the tax administration and 
who have been sent notices of their new tax bills” (Baer and LeBorgne, 2008, p. 17).
17 One extreme exception was the Massachusetts-4 (2010) amnesty that limited eligibility to taxpayers who 
received a special “Tax Amnesty Notice” from the state. While sending notices of the amnesty to taxpayers 
is not exceptional, making the amnesty an “invitation only” event — and simultaneously promising extra 
penalties to those who do not participate — certainly is.
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at least partial interest forgiveness.18 The pattern of interest relief continues into the 
2010s, when 12 of the 15 amnesties so far have provided at least partial interest relief in 
addition to penalty relief. Because many states in recent years have at least an informal 
program of providing penalty relief for any taxpayer who makes a voluntary disclosure 
of unknown liabilities, the forgiveness of penalty in formal amnesty program provides 
little marginal incentive, meaning that the best remaining award for enticing taxpay-
ers into the amnesty program involves reductions in interest payments. This is likely 
the reason for the gradual shift in the extent to which this incentive is offered to bring 
taxpayers into the system. At their least generous, the Florida-3 (1992) and Illinois-1 
(1981) programs offered only amnesty from prosecution.
In many respects, forgiving interest is the most sensitive element of the amnesty in 
terms of maintaining equity and compliance incentives. The programs do not relieve 
the basic tax obligation, so that is not an issue, and the penalty has been demonstrated 
not to have its intended effect if the taxpayer is delinquent, so it involves no great 
revenue loss if waived. But to forgive interest is tantamount to giving the evaders an 
interest-free loan, and that gives the tax cheat an economic advantage over honest tax-
payers.19 This advantage clearly has been on the minds of amnesty designers, as several 
programs have only a partial or no interest waiver. Interest obligations do accumulate 
on older liabilities, however, and some recent programs have created special higher 
waiver rates for such older obligations.20 The recent Florida program went as far as 
distinguishing between taxpayers who are being audited or under inquiry, examination, 
and civil investigation and those who initiate contact with the Department of Taxation. 
The former may receive a waiver of 25 percent of interest while the latter may receive 
a 50 percent waiver. For the few amnesties providing data on the age of the delinquent 
liability collected, however, a large amount of the total recovery comes from accounts 
that only recently became delinquent. Figure 2 demonstrates this point by summing the 
total recoveries by age of delinquency for the six amnesty programs that report these 
data, and then dividing it by total amnesty collections. Within these aggregates, the 
percentages of total recovery from tax years no more distant than fi ve years are 77.15 
for Kentucky-2 (2002), 81.8 for West Virginia-2 (2004), 71.54 for Indiana-1 (2005), 
18 While interest rates were historically low in the 2000s, it would be premature to conclude that this meant 
the waiver of accrued interest was unimportant. First, the interest rates states charge against delinquent 
payments are typically higher than “risk-free” Treasury bill rates, though the mark-up usually differs by 
the type of liability. Second, interest accrues throughout the period taxpayers are delinquent, so the history 
of interest rates over the lifetime of the liability is usually more important than the spot rate at the time 
the amnesty declares a waiver of accrued interest.
19 Since the 1980s, the prime interest rate has been on a path of secular decline. Using tax delinquency as a 
source of operating capital is thus relatively less attractive now than in the past — credit-worthy businesses 
can get the money at low interest rates from traditional sources. Furthermore, to the extent that the interest 
rate on delinquent payments generally tracks market rates, the state sacrifi ces less by forgiving interest. 
Both infl uences work toward making interest waivers more likely.
20 The Maine-4 (2010) amnesty waived 95 percent of the penalty for short term liabilities and 95 percent of 
the penalty plus interest for older liabilities. The New York-5 (2010) amnesty waived 50 percent of penalty 
and interest for newer liabilities and 80 percent for older ones.
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62.24 for Iowa-2 (2007), 65.73 for Pennsylvania-2 (2010), and 59.73 for Pennsylvania-1 
(1995). Recoveries from delinquent accounts of less than a year or two are often not 
eligible for amnesty, which is a policy intended to prevent taxpayers from becoming 
delinquent just for the purposes of participating in the amnesty, effectively treating the 
state as a short-term loan offi cer. It would seem from these data that programs which 
offer only a limited look back for amnesty would likely not be forgoing signifi cant 
revenue. Also, devoting signifi cant resources to collecting older accounts might not 
represent a prudent investment for a state tax compliance department.
C. Amnesty Length
State amnesty programs run for a limited number of days. Requests for amnesty 
must be fi led within a specifi c period in order to be eligible for consideration. The 
early amnesties tended to run for about three months. Later amnesties are shorter, now 
averaging close to two months. That would be consistent with taking advantage of the 
improved communication and information technology systems that have developed in 
the past quarter century of amnesty history.
Figure 2
Age of Tax Liability as a Share of Total Recovery
Notes: Shares represent unweighted averages from Kentucky-2 (2002), West Virginia-2 (2004), Indiana-1 
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As one might surmise, the amnesty record shows that a longer amnesty period is 
associated with a lower recovery per day during the program, as participation is either 
fi xed or only increases at a diminishing rate with amnesty length. For amnesties of 60 
or fewer days, the median daily recovery is $744,848, while for amnesties of 80 to 100 
days, it is $278,852, and for amnesties of 110 days or longer, $95,076. The shortened 
amnesty period that has emerged suggests that amnesty design has responded to this 
pattern of diminished returns from long programs.
D. Quarter in Which Amnesty Conducted
Amnesties have tended to be conducted in the later quarters of the calendar year (i.e., 
the beginning of most state fi scal years). In the early amnesty era, there was a concern 
that amnesties earlier in the year would confl ict with the heaviest part of income tax 
fi ling season and that adding this work would complicate both administration and 
compliance. These administrative and compliance concerns appear to have become 
somewhat less important in the most recent decade with more programs offered earlier 
in the year. The third calendar quarter is the most popular quarter for an amnesty, with 
45 percent of all programs conducted then.
E. Installment Plans
The amnesty programs differ in regard to whether they require the full liability be 
paid during the amnesty period (or shortly thereafter) to receive the amnesty incen-
tive or whether they allow the taxpayer to establish an installment plan for payment 
of the liability over some period in the future. Since participants in amnesty programs 
have shown themselves to be less than reliable taxpayers, it may be surprising that 
amnesty programs established such installment programs at all.21 However, if the 
objective is to improve compliance and administration, these installment plans serve 
the purpose of enticing such taxpayers to at least come forward and make them-
selves known, even if they ultimately cannot fulfi ll the obligations of their payment 
plans.
Here again the data presented in Table 3 show a considerable change in structure 
when later amnesties are compared to earlier ones. In the amnesties of the 1980s, 17 
programs allowed installment payments while 16 did not. There was also a close split 
for the 1990s amnesties, with eight programs allowing amnesties while nine did not. But 
that changed in the 2000s, as only 15 of the 51 amnesties permitted installment plans 
and only one of 15 amnesties to date in the 2010s have allowed an installment payment 
option.
21 In fact, state amnesty reports often indicate that taxpayer failure to comply with installment plans is a 
common reason for amnesty denial. For instance, the New York-3 (2002) amnesty program reported that 
more than 100,000 of the 120,000 amnesty applications that were denied were due to taxpayers failing to 
complete an installment program, though they still collected more than $35 million in revenue from this 
group (New York State Offi ce of Tax Policy Analysis, 2004). The 120,000 denied applicants represented 
11 percent of the total applications in the New York-3 (2002) amnesty program.
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F. Accompanying Programs
Amnesties have often been bundled with other programs, revealing a mixture of 
interest in both recovering tax revenue and in favorably infl uencing the compliance 
climate. In an early study, Mikesell (1986, pp. 522–523) found amnesty programs to be 
accompanied by additional programs designed to improve future compliance, and even 
argued that the amnesty may have been the cover necessary to make such enforcement 
enhancements and other changes to the rules “politically palatable.” These programs 
increased penalties and interest for the future, made tax evasion a felony, promised more 
rigorous enforcement, introduced new computer technologies, and allowed for improved 
audit detection techniques, among other changes (Mikesell, 1986; Alm and Beck, 1991). 
In contrast, it does not seem to be the case that the more recent programs can be viewed 
as providing political cover for ramping up enforcement practices. Most of the recent 
amnesties are in states that had offered amnesty in the past and had made substantive 
administrative changes with the earlier amnesty, and thus had fewer opportunities to 
introduce new enforcement initiatives with their more recent amnesty programs. Table 
4 identifi es the programs since 2000 that accompanied the amnesties, either directly in 
the legislation instituting the amnesty or in materials (guides, news releases, advertis-
ing, etc.) produced by the revenue administration about the amnesty. Recent programs 
have accompanying compliance programs less frequently than was the case for the 
early amnesties.
In the 58 amnesty programs identifi ed in Table 4, only 26 bundled an accompanying 
program of any kind, suggesting the absence of a genuine interest in improving the 
long-run compliance effort. Furthermore, those programs that did take place do not 
have an orientation towards improving the overall compliance environment. Only 14 
(including West Virginia-2 (2004), which has both compliance and recovery features) of 
the 26 programs made changes to the post-amnesty compliance environment by increas-
ing penalties and interest, devoting amnesty proceeds to additional tax enforcement 
resources, or giving additional powers to tax enforcement. The remaining 12 amnesty 
programs listed in Table 4 were structured to increase recovery without providing 
changes to improve future compliance. These states structured their programs so that 
taxpayers who were eligible for the amnesty program but did not would be subject to 
extra penalties if discovered. In these cases, other future taxpayers would be subject 
to only ordinary penalties. Such a program creates an incentive to participate in the 
amnesty if a taxpayer is currently evading or delinquent, but has no effect on the long 
term revenue incentives and compliance of future possible evaders. Therefore, for most 
states, the amnesty was provided, but there were no changes in penalties, enforcement, 
or any other program that might make tax evasion less advantageous post-amnesty than 
pre-amnesty among the general population. The compliance rules and consequences 
would be expected to be no stricter after the amnesty.
The compliance initiatives attached to amnesties in recent years have been modest 
when compared to the changes that accompanied amnesties in the 1980s. This is also 
likely a consequence of the passage of time, as states were generally able to fi nd the 
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means to computerize and otherwise improve their tax administration systems by the 
start of the 21st century. Whether a part of the amnesty wave of the 1980s or not, by 
2000, evasion had become a felony in state tax systems. Interest and penalties could 
only be reasonably added at the margin in repeat amnesties, and promises of a “one-
time only event” presumably lose their credibility.22
G. Prior Amnesty Experience
As previously discussed, amnesties were often advertised as a last chance for tax 
compliance before stricter programs were implemented. Because of the considerable 
concern about the effects of an amnesty on the compliance environment, states felt it 
necessary to emphasize that, although the amnesty recoveries proved that many taxpay-
ers had successfully evaded taxes in the past, conditions were changing and what had 
worked before would not work in the future. The amnesty provided the last opportunity 
to comply before the tax evasion was discovered and had even greater consequences. 
Obviously, virtually all amnesties conducted in the 1980s were the fi rst ones run by a 
state — but even then 10 percent were repeat programs. Overall, 62 percent of amnes-
ties are repeat programs. Since the 1980s, the share of amnesties in a decade that were 
the fi rst run by the state has continually declined, from 44.4 percent in the 1990s to 
13.7 percent in the 2000s, and then to 6.7 percent (one state) thus far in the 2010s. As 
noted earlier, only fi ve states have yet to conduct an amnesty, so the prospects for new 
programs this decade are not great.
Multiple amnesty states generally wait fi ve years or more before repeating an amnesty 
(more than eighty percent did so in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s), but only 73.3 percent 
have waited that long for the 2010s to date. The percentage of states waiting more than 
10 years before running another amnesty has declined consistently, from 90 percent 
in the 1980s, to 72.2 percent in the 1990s, to 58.8 percent in the 2000s, and to 26.7 
percent in the 2010s. Seldom would states now be able to make a convincing claim that 
an amnesty represents a unique opportunity to come clean with the state tax system. If 
one is run, there is likely to be another coming relatively soon. Of the 45 states plus the 
District of Columbia that have run or scheduled amnesties, only 11 have stopped with 
one (so far, at least), and 23 states have run three or more programs.
IV. ANALYZING THE AMNESTY EXPERIENCES: WHAT THE RECOVERY 
  RECORD SHOWS
This section investigates empirically which amnesty features are associated with 
a productive amnesty program. A similar exercise was performed for the 28 earliest 
amnesty programs by Alm and Beck (1991), who used amnesty revenues as a proxy for 
income tax evasion among the states, which they regressed on the expected determinants 
22 States, however, continue to make this claim; for example, as demonstrated in Table 4, the West Virginia-2 
(2004) amnesty promised to be a one-time only event while being in its second iteration.
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of income tax compliance. Of course, as Alm and Beck (1991) noted, this created mea-
surement error problems since amnesties involved more taxes than just the income tax. 
As previously demonstrated in Table 2, the amnesty recovery shares for various taxes 
often differ substantially from their shares in routine state tax collections. Therefore 
we model the output of an amnesty program as the result of a revenue production func-
tion of two classes of inputs: unpaid tax liabilities and amnesty program design. The 
latter input classifi cation has been the subject of the narrative analysis to this point in 
the paper. The amount of unpaid tax liabilities should naturally lead to larger amnesty 
recoveries, but is a stock of unknown size that must be captured with proxy variables. 
These proxy variables for unpaid liabilities include the share of total personal income 
coming from reported nonfarm proprietor income, the existence of a national reces-
sion, the intensity of federal audits, and the absence of a state sales tax. The amnesty 
program features will include indicators for repeat amnesties, the lag time between 
amnesties, the eligibility of accounts receivable, the implementation of an installment 
payment plan, the length of the amnesty, the quarter in which the amnesty was held, 
and whether or not there exists an alternative to the amnesty in the form of a voluntary 
disclosure program. These specifi c variables will be discussed in greater detail below.
The measure of amnesty output to be explained is the amnesty recovery as a share 
of the state’s total tax revenue (in millions) in the previous year. Dividing recovery by 
revenue scales the data and mitigates the need to incorporate variables that explain the 
potential size of the tax base. Since amnesty recoveries are correlated with bringing new 
taxpayers onto the tax rolls, the amnesty recovery could be associated with increases in 
total tax revenues through improved compliance. As a result, recovery is scaled by the 
previous year’s tax revenue to avoid this potential simultaneity bias in measurement, 
and this variable will be referred to as the recovery rate.23
Because states repeat infrequently, the model will be estimated as a pooled cross-
section of the 108 state tax amnesty programs through 2010 for which complete data 
are available, though specifi cations to check the sensitivity of the model to outliers 
will also be presented.24 The appendix provides descriptive statistics for this range 
of observations. The production of the amnesty recovery rate (RecoveryRate) will be 





+ + + + +
+ + + + +
RecoveryRate b b NoSalesTax b HighAuditState
 b Recession b NFPIncomeShr b SecondAmnesty
 b ThirdAmnesty b Lag b VDP b AcctsReceivable b Install
 b Open60t99Days b Open100pDays Q Decade
ln( ) 0 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12
23 The authors appreciate helpful discussion from the editor and an anonymous referee on this issue. Note 
that the recovery rates in Table 1 use tax revenue for the year of the amnesty in order to gauge fi scal sig-
nifi cance in the period of the amnesty.
24 Among the regressors, the only observation with missing information prior to 2010 is on the existence 
of an installment plan in the South Dakota-2 (2001) program. Washington, DC is also excluded in all 
specifi cations because it has features of both state and local government.
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Defi nitions, sources, and summary statistics are provided in the appendix. As previ-
ously described, the variables associated with coeffi cients b1 through b4 are intended 
to proxy for the amount of unpaid tax liabilities. Sales tax compliance is known to be 
particularly high, because the vendor acts only as a third party collection agent between 
customer and the government.25 States that generate revenue without the use of the sales 
tax are therefore likely to have a larger stock of unpaid revenue.26 Also, states over-
whelmingly link their income tax compliance programs to federal efforts. States with 
greater federal compliance enforcement activity are likely to have lower state amnesty 
recovery potential, with the federal enforcement effort having spilled over to the state 
tax structure. Though data on federal audit intensity by state differ over time and are 
incomplete, the existing data do demonstrate that federal audit rates are systematically 
higher in some states than others (Birskyte, 2008).27 States that have an average rank-
ing in the top-10 most audited states in the available data (1997–2001) are identifi ed 
as “high audit states” with a dummy variable (HighAuditState), with the expectation 
that these states will have lower recoveries in their amnesty programs than others (b2 
< 0). If recessions cause taxpayers to become delinquent or to evade their taxes, then 
they may be correlated with amnesty participation (b3 > 0). Finally, states with high 
levels of self-employment likely have lower levels of routine tax compliance.28 The 
amount of self-employment activity in the state is measured by the share of the state’s 
total personal income derived from non-farm proprietor’s income, and is expected to 
be positively related to the recovery rate (b4 > 0).
The motivation behind the remaining amnesty program variables is largely derived 
from the major identifi able structures of these programs that have been discussed 
throughout this paper. Indicator variables identify whether the state previously enacted 
an amnesty program, by including controls to indicate if the amnesty is the state’s 
second program (SecondAmnesty) or if it is the third or more frequent program (Third-
Amnesty). Presumably, amnesties would have smaller recoveries with each iteration due 
to a reduced pool of non-complaint taxpayers, so that b5 and b6 are negative. The more 
time that passes between amnesties (Lag) should increase the recovery rate since the 
stock of evaders and uncollected accounts accumulates over time. The Lag variable is 
measured for the regression as “1/(number of months since last amnesty).” Using this 
25 High sales tax compliance of course does not extent to the use tax..
26 It is conceivable that tax rates themselves may matter in determining how much information tax pay-
ing entities reveal to the state. Unfortunately, the various defi nitional changes to rates, levels, and bases 
across states both over time and cross-sections make introducing the rates themselves infeasible. Proxy 
variables, like sales and income tax revenues as a share of total personal income, were tested but found to 
be statistically insignifi cant, whereas a dummy variable for sales tax usage has explanatory power. This 
suggests the tax portfolio is perhaps more important than the rates. Similarly, state income tax variables 
seem to have no effect on recoveries, likely because the federal government monitors reporting and states 
primarily piggy-back on this effort.
27 High audit states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. 
28 Slemrod (2007) notes the relatively higher non-compliance rate among the self-employed found in Internal 
Revenue analyses, a pattern that is likely to carry over to state income tax systems as well.
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inverse relationship allows us to handle the conditionality of repeat amnesties with a 
consistent ordering. A state never before offering amnesty can be thought of as 1/∞ = 
0, an amnesty offered 20 years ago as 1/240 = 0.004, and one ending in the previous 
month as 1/1 = 1.
If the amnesty program is conducted in a state that also operates a voluntary disclo-
sure program (VDP), then the amnesty program has a smaller marginal benefi t over 
the state’s routine operations, and thus the program will have lower recoveries (b8 < 
0).29 Also included are dummy variables representing the eligibility of accounts receiv-
able (AcctsReceivable), whether or not taxpayers can pay through an installment plan 
(Install), and the quarter in which the amnesty program began (Q).30 The inclusion 
of accounts receivable should increase collections (b9 > 0), and if installment plans 
encourage participation then they will increase recoveries as well (b10 > 0). Several state 
amnesty reviews have found that a conventional view among program administrators 
is that increasing the duration of the amnesty period allows for more participation and 
amnesty collection. Evidence noted earlier, however, shows a declining recovery per 
day as the amnesty period becomes longer, suggesting diminishing returns from a longer 
amnesty. This motivates the pair of dummy variables for the duration of the amnesty, 
which if the state administrators are correct, will have a positive effect on amnesty 
recovery (b11, b12  > 0). As also discussed previously, early amnesty programs tended to 
administer the program late in the calendar year for fear of interfering with regular tax 
administration responsibilities for both the state authority and the individual taxpayer, 
but over time they have become more uniform across the year. The control for quarterly 
dummies will identify if this change in timing has a signifi cant impact on recoveries. 
Finally, a set of dummy variables for each decade is introduced (Decade). The control 
for decades is intended to capture institutional changes that might be diffi cult to observe 
as states transitioned from an emphasis on improved administration and compliance 
to increased revenue generation. As discussed in the earlier section, our observation 
that amnesties have increasingly become geared towards revenue generation is based 
on how states have changed their observed structural features, but regression analysis 
will demonstrate if this trend remains after controlling for other unobserved features.
Table 5 provides the estimates of the regression model under alternative sets of restric-
tions.31 Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are employed even when the 
Breusch-Pagan test was unable to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. 
Specifi cation (A) estimates a model with only the controls variables intended to proxy 
29 In this dataset, the states that operate a voluntary disclosure program include Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, 
Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin. When it was unclear if a state with a current voluntary disclosure program had the program 
during earlier amnesty programs, it was coded as having one at that time as well.
30 The variable Q is an n × 3 matrix of quarter identifi ers, with the fourth quarter excluded. The parameter 
α is a 3 × 1 vector of coeffi cients.
31 For dummy variables, the more precise estimation of the marginal effect in a semi-log specifi cation is 
exp(β) – 1, but this is not reported due to space limitations; see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for an 
illustration.
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for unpaid tax liabilities, while specifi cation (B) controls only for amnesty program 
features. Specifi cation (C) combines the fi rst two specifi cations, and specifi cation (D) 
adds the decade indicators. Specifi cation (E) drops the seven amnesty programs that 
excluded a major broad-based tax. A residual analysis demonstrates that fi ve outliers 
result in a skewed distribution of errors, even with the removal of the observations in 
specifi cation (E). After removing these outliers in specifi cation (F), the residuals take 
a normal distribution as suggested by skewness and kurtosis tests. The mean variance-
infl ation-factor (VIF), reported for each specifi cation, suggests multicollinearity is not 
a signifi cant problem.32
Comparing the adjusted-R2 across specifi cations (A) through (D) suggests most of 
the explanatory power is derived from the amnesty structure variables. The OLS model 
has just a few statistically signifi cant variables, likely due to the relatively small num-
ber of degrees of freedom and sensitivity to the normal distribution assumptions. One 
should keep in mind, however, that the sample here is very close to the full population, 
so statistical signifi cance is more informative about a hypothesized larger sample than 
for the historical observations. Specifi cations (D) through (F) will serve as the main 
results when discussing the magnitude of the coeffi cients.
The coeffi cients of the variables in Table 5 generally have the expected signs and are 
relatively robust in size and sign, with the main difference between specifi cations being 
in statistical signifi cance. Examining fi rst the four variables measuring the size of unpaid 
liabilities, only the Recession indicator switches signs across specifi cations, though it 
is not statistically signifi cant in any specifi cation. Though statistically signifi cant in 
just two specifi cations, the effect of not having a sales tax takes the expected sign in 
all specifi cations and the magnitude is relatively constant throughout. For an amnesty 
program that would otherwise recover 0.5 percent of its annual tax revenue, the fully 
specifi ed models estimated in columns (D) through (F) suggest the effect of not having 
a sales tax increases the recovery rate by 0.73 to 0.78 percent.33 The evidence is simi-
lar among states with high federal audit rates. The sign and size of the coeffi cient on 
HighAuditState are similar across specifi cations, with statistical signifi cance fl uctuating 
between specifi cations based on degrees of freedom. The effect of being a high audit 
state reduces an amnesty recovery rate of 0.5 to a recovery rate of 0.42 to 0.33 percent.34 
Finally, non-farm proprietors income is positively correlated with greater recovery rates 
and is statistically signifi cant at the 5 percent level in specifi cations (E) and (F). Those 
point estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in the NFPIncomeShr would 
increase a 0.5 percent recovery rate to 0.63 percent.35
Turning attention to the amnesty program features, two variables that stand out in 
Table 5 are the inclusion of accounts receivable and the accompaniment of a voluntary 
disclosure program. The accounts receivable indicator is statistically signifi cant at the 1 
32 No individual variable carries a VIF score above four in any specifi cation.
33 Calculations: ([exp(0.38) – 1 = 0.46] × 0.5) + 0.5 = 0.73; ([exp(0.44) – 1 = 0.55] × 0.5) + 0.5 = 0.78.
34 Calculations: ([exp(–0.18) – 1 = –0.17] × 0.5) + 0.5 = 0.42; ([exp(–0.43) – 1= –0.35] × 0.5) + 0.5 = 0.33.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































percent level in all specifi cations, and the point estimates in specifi cations (D) through 
(F) suggest it would increase a 0.5 percent recovery rate to 1.37 or 2.34 percent.36 
This is the largest effect observed among the dummy variables, and is consistent with 
Mikesell’s (1986) early observation that accounts receivable is the main distinguishing 
feature between amnesty program size, as well as Alm and Beck’s (1991) fi nding on the 
eligibility of delinquent taxpayers. Though accounts receivable is an attribute tax admin-
istrators sometimes have control over during amnesty offerings, these also represent the 
“softest” returns as participation in the amnesty implies the state could probably have 
collected the entire amount through existing enforcement devices. Amnesties in states 
that operate a voluntary disclosure program, a competing device that allows delinquent 
taxpayers to avoid more signifi cant punishment, also experienced lower recovery rates 
by statistically signifi cant margins. The coeffi cients for voluntary disclosure program 
suggest they would lower a 0.50 percent recovery rate to about 0.30 percent.37
Despite lacking statistical signifi cance, the signs of the quarter indicators are consistent 
with the traditional concern that offering amnesties in the beginning of the calendar year 
would interfere with the collections process. Using the fourth quarter as the reference 
group, having the amnesty in the fi rst quarter is associated with lower collections while 
the highest collections occurred in third quarter amnesties. There does not appear to 
be evidence, however, to support the view that amnesty program length signifi cantly 
encourages participation. Dummy variables for amnesty program length actually carry 
a negative sign in many specifi cations, though it is possible that some reverse causality 
is occurring, and amnesties with low recoveries result in an extension of the size of the 
window of opportunity.
The evidence from the regressions in Table 5 is that repeated amnesties have smaller 
recoveries than the fi rst program, though this fi nding is not statistically signifi cant and 
is sensitive to outliers. Relative to a fi rst amnesty with a one percent recovery rate, the 
full sample specifi cation in column (D) indicates that the second amnesty has recovery 
rates that are 0.26 percent points lower, and third or higher amnesties recover 0.19 
percentage points less than the initial amnesty.38 The time lag between amnesties is 
measured as the inverse number of months, with fi rst amnesties taking a value of zero; 
this treats amnesties that are far apart as more similar to fi rst amnesties in this measure 
than those that are closer together.39 The point estimates indicate that about a 12 month 
increase in the time since an initial amnesty with a 0.5 percent recovery rate would 
increase the revenue recovery rate by about 0.04 percentage points, though this is not 
statistically signifi cant.40 Likewise, installment plans apparently increase participation 
enough to increase the recovery rate in specifi cation (D), but the effect is not statisti-
cally signifi cant and is sensitive to outliers. Specifi cations (E) and (F) demonstrate that 
36 Calculations: ([exp(1.54) – 1 = 3.68] × 0.5) + .5 = 2.34; ([exp(1.01) – 1 = 1.74] × 0.5) + 0.5 = 1.37.
37 Calculations: ([exp(–0.48) – 1 = –0.38] × 0.5) + .5 = 0.31; ([exp(–0.56) – 1 = –0.43] × 0.5) + 0.5 = 0.29.
38 Calculations: exp(–0.30) – 1 = –0.26; exp(–0.21) – 1 = –0.19.
39 Alternative approaches to inverse number of months, such as using dummy variables to indicate different 
lengths of intervals between amnesties, yielded qualitatively same results.
40 Calculations: ([(–1/12) × –0.96] × 0.5 = 0.04) + 0.5 = 0.54; ([(–1/12) × –0.88] × 0.5 = 0.036) + 0.5 = 0.536.
Contributions of State Tax Amnesties to State Revenues 557
recovery rates have fallen by statistically signifi cant margins during the millennium 
decade, but this is also sensitive to the choice of sample.
These results are suggestive of the trade-offs confronted by amnesty program admin-
istrators. As described earlier, permitting an installment payment plan probably entices 
some taxpayers to come forward even though it seems many will be unlikely to live 
up to the terms of the agreement. States have been dropping this feature in the revenue 
maximizing era in hopes of quickly collecting the full liability, but the evidence pre-
sented in Table 5 suggests that the revenue recovered is not substantively infl uenced. 
This suggests that policy makers can retain this feature of good administration without 
signifi cantly compromising revenue. Similarly, offering amnesty in the third quarter 
was done historically to prevent substantial interference with routine collections, while 
more recently amnesties have become more evenly distributed throughout the year. The 
evidence suggests that a third quarter beginning is most highly correlated with revenue 
recovery, although the effect is not statistically signifi cant. Shutting down the program 
within 60 days also seems to cost no revenue, and shortens the demands on administrative 
resources. However, if a state wants a large recovery, permitting known delinquencies 
through accounts receivable and shutting down voluntary disclosure programs seem to 
have the most to offer in terms of gross recovery, though these changes would confl ict 
with good existing tax administration policies.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
An exploration of the structures of state tax amnesties and amnesty policies reveals 
that the purpose of state tax amnesty programs has evolved. Early amnesty programs 
were coupled with important administrative reforms and efforts at improving compli-
ance and enforcement, while the structure of recent programs and their timing relative 
to adverse fi scal shocks demonstrates an emphasis on revenue generation. In fact, many 
of these recent structural changes are inconsistent with an administrative system that 
values compliance and enforcement. Indeed, a regression analysis of the effects of 
amnesty features on amnesty recoveries suggests that if states are aggressively pursuing 
revenue maximization, the factors they can modify that are most infl uential on revenues 
also compromise existing tax administration. This raises some concerns because the 
historical record has demonstrated amnesty recoveries are seldom large enough to make 
any dramatic impact on state fi nances, even compared to non-traditional slack revenue 
sources such as rainy day funds or lotteries. Even among the early amnesties, which 
were more interested in long-term compliance and tax administration, the preponder-
ance of evidence suggests that amnesties represent only a temporary revenue shock, 
not a continuing fi scal base.
Somewhat paradoxically, if state legislatures continue to enact amnesty programs, 
the belief that there is zero long-term revenue effect at best or a negative effect at worst 
suggests that administrators should seek to maximize revenue to the greatest possible 
extent, as it will likely be the only fi scal contribution. Should an amnesty be offered, 
the empirical evidence from prior programs suggests that gross revenue collections may 
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be increased by making accounts receivable eligible for amnesty relief, by keeping the 
program open less than 60 days, and by holding the program in the third quarter of the 
calendar year. States that do not regularly tax sales, have low federal audit rates, and do 
not operate a voluntary disclosure program are likely to fi nd their recoveries to be higher. 
Finally, states should recognize that the evidence indicates that historically collections 
decline with each successive offering and increase with the amount of time since the 
last amnesty, holding constant the other structural features of the amnesty program.
Several open questions remain regarding even the immediate revenue fl ow — would 
ordinary state enforcement systems have eventually brought in the revenue, rendering 
the net effect negative due to waived penalty and interest? Do amnesties have any effect 
on the perceived fairness of the tax administration system? Does substantial amnesty 
recovery measure the futility of tax administration, and therefore advertise that success-
ful evasion is quite feasible? The avalanche of tax amnesties since 2000 and generally 
improving state revenue yields with the end of the Great Recession probably mean a 
pause in the pace of such programs for a few years. Nevertheless, it appears that such 
programs have become an accepted tool in state tax administration, as states generally 
regard their experiences with amnesties to have been successful.41 As amnesty programs 
continue, future lawmakers and tax administrators may learn from the experiences of 
the 117 amnesties in the fi rst 30 years of amnesty history.
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APPENDIX A
A1. Defi nitions and Sources
Recovery/Revenue is amnesty recovery as a share of total tax revenue collected in the year 
prior to the amnesty start date, multiplied by one million; revenue data are from U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Governments Division. No Sales Tax is a dummy variable, where 1 indicates the 
absence of a state sales tax in the year of the amnesty. High Audit State is a dummy variable, 
where a value of 1 indicates that the state’s mean rank in federal audits from 1997–2001 was 
in the top-10 most audited; the source is the Transactional Records Access Clearing House of 
Syracuse University (http://trac.syr.edu). Recession is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
1 if there was a national recession as defi ned by the NBER. NFP Income Shr is the proportion of 
state personal income from non-farm proprietor’s income in the year prior to the amnesty start 
date; the source is U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov).  Second Amnesty 
is a dummy variable, where 1 indicates a state’s second amnesty program. Third+ Amnesty is a 
Table A1




Recovery/Revenue 6,841 69,14 12.75 27,599
No Sales Tax 0.04 0.19 0 1
High Audit 0.25 0.44 0 1
Recession 0.08 0.28 0 1
NFP Income Shr 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.15
Second Amnesty 0.31 0.47 0 1
Third+ Amnesty 0.29 0.45 0 1
Amnesty Includes Accounts Receivable 0.66 0.48 0 1
State Has Voluntary Disclosure Program 0.22 0.42 0 1
Amnesty Has Installment Payment Plan 0.35 0.48 0 1
Amnesty Open 60–99 Days 0.46 0.50 0 1
Amnesty Open 100+ Days 0.11 0.32 0 1
Quarter 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Quarter 2 0.14 0.35 0 1
Quarter 3 0.45 0.50 0 1
1990s 0.15 0.36 0 1
2000s 0.56 0.50 0 1
Note: The sample size is 108.
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dummy variable, where 1 indicates a state’s third (or higher) amnesty program. The variable 1/
(Months since last amnesty) is the inverse of the number of months between the ending month of 
the last amnesty and the starting month of the current amnesty, with zero being employed if the 
state has never offered previously offered an amnesty. Amnesty Includes Accounts Receivable is 
an indicator variable, where 1 indicates an amnesty program that includes accounts receivable 
among the eligible liabilities. State Has Voluntary Disclosure Program is a dummy variable 
indicating that the state offers some program where taxpayers can voluntarily reveal themselves 
to the state tax authorities without fear of criminal prosecution; the primary source was Setze 
(2009). Amnesty Has Installment Payment Plan is an indicator variable where 1 indicates the 
amnesty program permitted self-reporters to participate in a repayment plan. Amnesty Open X 
Days is an indicator for the range of days the amnesty was open. Quarter X is an indicator variable, 
where 1 indicates an amnesty occurred during quarter X. Finally, 1990s and 2000s are dummy 
variables that indicate if the amnesty start date began after 1989 or after 1999, respectively.
A2. Amnesty Program and Recovery Data
Data are from the authors’ compilation from state amnesty evaluation reports, state press 
releases, news reports, state statutes, and various third party tabulations. Important third party 
sources include the Federation of Tax Administrators tabulation available at their website, http://
www.taxadmin.org/, Mikesell (1986), and Joint Committee on Taxation (1998).
